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In previous jury outcome research, psychologists have studied such 
factors as juror and defendant characteristics, factors of evidence 
such as the validity of eyewitness testimony, and legal procedural 
rules. The present study was an attempt to differentiate the impact 
of various factors of psychological stress on the mitigation of hom­
icide. The factors were empirically derived in pilot work completed 
previous to this study. An important aspect of this research was 
the presentation of the stress factors by an expert witness.
This study employed a 2X2X5 factorial design. Male and female 
subjects were presented with written case materials that varied by 
Type of Crime and Type of Expert Testimony. The Type of Crime was 
either a homicide involving a husband and wife or a homicide involv­
ing two friends in a bar. The Type of Expert Testimony was one of 
the following; A) Traumatic Childhood, B) Mental Illness, C) Recent 
Stress, D) Substance Abuse, and E) Antisocial Personality (comparison 
group). Subjects were randomly assigned to each of the conditions 
and rated the mitigating effects of the variables on both dichoto- 
mous (verdict) and continuous (Likert scales) measures.
Results were interpreted to support previous research that 
indicates that students are generally lenient as jurors and that 
expert witnesses are believable and influential in jury trials.
The results also confirmed research which suggests that dichotomous 
and continuous measures do not reflect a single judgmental process. 
There were mixed results for the Type of Expert Testimony and no 
Sex differences. Suggestions for future research were offered as 
well as a caution about the possible limitations of the generaliz- 
ability of the results.
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INTRODUCTION
The psychology of law has burgeoned in both interest 
and published work during recent years (Monahan and Loftus, 
1982), The American Psychology-Law Society is at record 
membership levels, an American Board of Forensic Psychology 
has been created, and the American Psychological
Association has formed Psychology and Law as its
forty-first division. Publications of articles on 
psychology and law have appeared in such mainline journals 
as Psychological Bulletin and Psychological Review. Other 
journals such as Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology have devoted entire issues to legal topics. The 
increased interest and activity of psychologists in the 
legal area is made evident by these organizational and 
publication developments.
A recent attempt to review and synthesize the findings 
of psychological research is that of Mohahan and Loftus
(1982). Their review breaks the area of psychology and law
into three functional domains. In the first domain of 
substantive law psychologists are addressing the validity 
of assumptions about behavior which is a basis for law. 
Examples of questions under study in this area include 
whether punishment can have a detering or rehabilitating 
effect on offenders (Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin, 1978), or 
whether the competence doctrines for children and
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psychologically disabled are valid (Whitehorn 1980 and 
Applebaum 1981). Another domain of study concerns the 
actual operation of the legal system. This second domain 
is focused on ways in which the law actually disposes of 
individual cases. Questions such as what factors 
constitute sentencing or parole decisions are a part of
this domain. Decision making in insanity cases has also 
been addressed (Pasewark, Pantle, and Steadman 1979). 
Monahan and Loftus* third domain is that of the legal 
process. More specifically this process domain is the 
study of factors which affect outcome in jury trials. Many 
variables have been studied as they relate to jury trials 
and include such elements as juror and defendant
characteristics, factors of evidence such as the validity 
of eyewitness testimony,and legal procedural rules. (For 
complete reviews jury research see Guerbasi, Zuckerman, and 
Reis, 1977; Saks and Hastie 1978; and Nemeth 1981).
One aspect of jury research which has received little 
attention is factors which are related to diminished
responsibility or mitigation in criminal trials. The
purpose of this research will be to begin exploratory 
research into factors which influence juror's decisions in 
assigning levels of criminality in a homicide case.
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Criminal law generally assumes that people are able to 
choose how to behave, and the law holds them responsible 
for their conduct. There are, however, instances where 
criminal law accepts the determinist accounts of behavior
and on these occasions holds external forces to be
responsible for a person's behavior. Between these two 
extremes of full responsibility and nonresponsibility is 
conduct in which the individual is strongly influenced by 
external forces, yet retains some choice in how to respond. 
In this latter condition a person is said to have
diminished responsibility or partial responsibility 
(Creach, 1982). The external forces which compose the 
remainder of a person's responsibility are called
mitigating factors.
The literal definition of mitigate is to lessen,
soften, or make less severe. In a court of law,
circumstances about an individual or crime are often 
introduced as mitigating factors. When the circumstances 
are considered mitigating, the law considers a person only 
partially responsible for his conduct. Sentencing for 
these people is also mitigated or reduced. The intent of 
the law is to make the punishment fit the level of
criminality, not the level of the crime.
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Despite some recent public concern about supposed 
leniency in criminal sentencing, the general trend is 
toward more individualized sentencing rather than less 
(Bonnie and Slobogin, 1980). Structured sentencing is
continually being refined in an effort to calibrate the 
responsibility of criminal defendants. Even though we 
witness the growing use of mitigation in criminal 
sentencing, it is often criticized for its subjectivity and 
inconsistency. Thus far, no consistent pattern of
evidentiary factors can be found to distinguish between 
successful and unsuccessful claims of diminished
responsibility (Arenella, 1977),
Development af the Diminished Responsibility Defense
Diminished responsibility has not been accepted as a 
general principle for all of criminal law. The concept 
developed in homicide cases to permit the jury to convict 
mentally ill, but legally sane defendants of second degree 
murder (Arenella, 1977). The practical implications were 
that individuals convicted of second degree murder could 
not be considered for the death penalty and they received 
lesser sentences. To facilitate understanding, a basic
description of legal defenses will first be offered. These 
defenses are part of what is termed an affirmative defense. 
The affirmative defense is utilized in cases in which the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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defendant admits to an act but seeks an acquittal due to 
circumstances of the crime.
A. Mens Rea
The "mens rea" of an act is the state of mind 
accompanying the act. Statutes often require proof of 
mental elements related to specific intent crimes. While 
these "mens rea" elements differ by states and 
jurisdictions they usually include premeditating and 
deliberating, entertaining malice, or possessing an intent 
to kill. Defendants are allowed to offer evidence in 
trials to show that they lacked the mens rea required by 
law and are therefore not responsible for their acts. An 
example of this would be a case where the defense argues 
that the defendant lacked the mens rea of deliberation 
because of intoxication.
B. Actus Reus
The "actus reus" requirement of a crime considers 
whether or not the defendant acted voluntarily. In these 
cases, a person usually asserts that the behavior was due 
to automatism or unconsciousness. Such experiences as an 
epileptic seizure, a concussion, a somnambulistic fugue 
state, or dissociative episode are offered as proof of the 
lack of voluntary action.
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C. Insanity Defense
In general the insanity defense is offered to prove 
that a person lacked the mens rea or actus reus requirement 
of an offense because of mental illness. Laws governing 
the defense vary by state. The distinction between the 
insanity defense and other automatism or unconsciousness 
defenses is not always clear. The insanity defense 
ordinarily leads to civil commitment when successful, while 
the other defenses may lead to outright acquittal (Fox, 
1963) .
A problem with the insanity defense is that a person 
may be mentally ill but still meet the mens rea or actus 
reus requirements of a crime. In other words, the 
defendant is still legally sane. Consider the following 
Goedecke case as an example.
Like many other eighteen-year-olds, Raymond 
Goedecke was not getting along very well with 
his father. Raymond wanted to leave home and 
strike out on his own but his father, who was 
also his employer, would not permit it. Ray­
mond's resentment of his father's domination 
fueled many conflicts between them until fin­
ally the two stopped talking to each other.
This common story of a father and a 
son's failure to communicate took a bizarre 
twist when Raymond resolved the conflict by 
killing his entire family. He carefully 
planned his father's murder by establishing 
an alibi that he was asleep at a church camp 
on the night of the killing. After secretly 
leaving the camp and driving to his home, he 
took off his shoes and entered the house.
Picking up an iron bar in the garage, he went
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into his parents' bedroom and struck both his 
mother and father repeatedly. He continued 
to his brother's and sister's bedroom and 
beat them to death. After washing the blood 
off his clothes and opening the drawers to 
make it look as if someone had ransacked the 
house, he returned to the church camp. The 
next day, he returned to his parents' home 
with a friend and feigned surprise at finding 
the bodies.
At the trial for first-degree murder 
defense psychiatrists testified that Goedecke 
did not realize what he was doing on the eve­
ning of the murders because of a dissociative 
reaction. Prosecution psychiatrists agreed 
that he was mentally ill but concluded that 
mental disability did not interfere with his 
capacity to formulate the intent to kill or 
to understand that what he was doing was 
wrong. The jury found Goedecke guilty of 
first-degree murder of his father but insane 
when he killed the rest of his family. On 
appeal, the California Supreme Court reduced 
Goedecke's conviction for the killing of his 
father to murder in the second degree 
(Arenella, 1977) .
In this case, both sides agree that Ray Goedecke is 
mentally ill. However, the jury decides that he does not
cross the line of legal insanity until after killing his 
father. The Supreme Court's reduction of the conviction 
for first-degree murder to second-degree murder changes the 
application of the law, Ray Goedecke's mental illness 
became a mitigating factor which reduced his responsibility 
for the crime and he was given a reduced sentence. This is 
different from the previous working of the law in which the 
result would have been either "not guilty by reason of 
insanity" or "sane and guilty".
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A similar case, in which an unsuccessful insanity plea 
resulted in mitigation was People v. Wolff.
In his confession to the police, Wolff 
admitted he had decided to kill his mother 
so that he could take girls to his house 
and rape them. He carefully planned the 
killing, including the selection and con­
cealment of the murder weapon, days before 
the homicide. Wolff consummated his plan by 
striking his mother from behind with an ax.
After a terrible struggle, she crawled to 
another room where Wolff caught her and 
choked her to death. He then turned himself 
in to the police.
The jury rejected Wolff's insanity 
defense despite the uniform consensus of all 
the expert witnesses that he was schizophrenic 
and legally insane at the time of the killing.
On appeal, the court reaffirmed its adherence 
to the M'Naughton test and refused to over­
turn the jury's finding of sanity (Arenella,
1977) .
Wolff was initially convicted of first-degree murder. The 
jury rejected Wolff's insanity defense despite the fact
that all the expert witnesses agreed that he was
schizophrenic. The problem was that the facts clearly 
indicated that Wolff formed specific intent to kill,
devised a plan, and had ample opportunity to think about 
his action. The expert testimony did not dispute the fact 
that Wolff had the capacity to premeditate and had 
deliberated before killing. Wolff fit the mens rea
requirement of the law even though he was mentally ill.
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The California Supreme Court reduced Wolff's 
conviction to second-degree murder because of his mental 
illness. The argument was offered that Wolff's mental 
illness robbed him of the capacity to evaluate the 
seriousness of his action in a meaningful manner. The 
Supreme Court's argument changed the mens rea inquiry from 
assessing whether the defendant had entertained the 
specific intent to why and how he had entertained it. By 
doing so, the California Supreme Court again laid the 
foundation for using the diminished responsibility defense. 
Wolff's mental illness mitigated his conviction from first 
to second-degree murder and subsequently reduced his 
sentence. The above cases are used to illustrate the 
difficulty of our legal system in separating the "bad" from 
"mad" criminal defendants. The cases also illustrate how 
the concepts of diminished responsibility and mitigating 
factors were accepted as part of the legal process 
concerning homicide. Since these initial cases, however, 
the diminished responsibility attributed to mitigating 
mental abnormality has been unchained from the mens rea 
requirements (Bonnie and Slobogin, 1980). In 1976 the 
United States Supreme Court made a decision upholding the 
use of capital punishment, and now all persons convicted of 
a capital murder may present evidence in mitigation. Any 
convicted murderer is now constitutionally entitled to a 
separate sentencing proceeding where the mitigating
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evidence is presented. These separate proceedings 
facilitate the trend for more individualized sentencing 
mentioned earlier in this work.
In addition to the sentencing proceedings for murder, 
many states have enacted legislation in regard to 
mitigating factors. For example, nearly every state
reenacting capital punishment has specified what 
constitutes mitigating circumstances and has included two 
responsibility formulations derived from the Model Penal 
Code. The formulations are whether or not the defendant's 
capacity to "appreciate the criminality...of his conduct or
contorm his conduct to the requirements of the law was
significantly impaired and whether he was suffering from 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance" at the time of the 
offense.
Montana Law
Apart from capital punishment, other states have 
enacted legislation concerning mitigation and the grading 
of offenses. Montana's homicide laws will be considered as 
an example of offense-grading legislation. In Montana, a 
person commits the offense of criminal homicide if he 
purposely, knowingly, or negligently causes the death of
another human being. Then, depending on the circumstances 
of the case, a person may be convicted of criminal homicide 
at one of three levels: deliberate homicide, mitigated
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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deliberate homicide, or negligent homicide. The Montana 
Code defines these levels of homicide as follows:
Criminal homicide constitutes delib­
erate homicide if it is committed purposely 
or knowingly, or it is committed while the 
offender is engaged in or is an accomplice 
in the commission of, or an attempt to 
commit, or flight after or attempting 
to commit robbery, sexual intercourse 
without consent, arson, burglary, 
kidnapping, felonious escape, or any 
other felony which involves the use 
of physical force or violence against 
any individual.
Criminal homicide is mitigated 
deliberate homicide when a homicide 
which would otherwise be deliberate 
homicide is committed under the influ­
ence of extreme mental or emotional stress 
for which there is reasonable explanation 
or excuse as shall be determined from the 
viewpoint of a reasonable person in the 
actor's situation.
Criminal homicide constitutes neg­
ligent homicide when it is committed 
negligently. In Montana, negligently is 
defined as when a person consciously 
disregards a risk that the result will 
occur or that the circumstances exist. 
(Montana Code Annotated, 1973, 94-5-102.)
Thus, Montana law provides an example of how diminished 
responsibility has been removed from the mens rea 
requirements of homicide. The mens rea for deliberate 
homicide is that the act be committed purposely or 
knowingly. Under mitigated homicide, the mens rea is still 
in effect- the person acts knowingly or purposely. The 
difference is that mitigated homicide is also accompanied 
by extreme mental or emotional stress.
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Diminished Responsibility and Expert Psychological
Testimony
Jurisdictions which allow for only a complete insanity 
defense without mitigation struggle with how to use expert
testimony. This is especially true in those places which
adhere to the M'Naughton test of responsibility. Under the 
M'Naughton testy the expert may testify only as to whether 
the defendant has a mental disease and whether it prevented 
him from knowing the nature and quality of his act or that 
the act was wrong. Many courts, therefore are not 
receptive to any testimony which explains the dynamics of a 
defendant's behavior.
Even in jurisdictions where the insanity rulings are 
more liberal than M'Naughton, there is often an 
encouragement of psychiatric labelling. Many courtroom 
battles have focused on whether or not the defendant
suffered from a demonstrable disease (Lewin, 1975). One 
expert may argue for the existence of a mental disease, 
while another may dispute the diagnosis. The arguments are 
sometimes semantic because both sides have observed the 
same symptoms but disagree as to a diagnostic label. The 
issue is left to a jury, yet there is little guidance for 
them in knowing which expert to believe. Nor is it usually 
clear in these cases for a jury to determine if the 
criminal act was product of the disease process.
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When a jurisdiction adopts a diminished responsibility 
doctrine, a shift from the focus of disease labeling to 
dynamic explanations of human behavior occurs. Instead of 
the court now asking if the defendant is mentally ill, the 
expert psychologist can offer a broader range of 
information to the jury. The witness may be asked to 
describe the defendant's capacity to organize thought 
processes, sort out real from unreal stimuli, hold clear 
and logical thoughts, and do similar tasks that may be an 
important element of the crime. The expert testimony can 
attempt to explain why a person acted the way they did, not 
whether they had the state of mind required by the mens rea 
at the time of the crime. The following case is an example 
of how testimony may be offered in an explanatory fashion.
Nicholas Gorshen was a longshoreman 
working at a San Francisco wharf. On the 
day of the crime, he reported to work in­
toxicated and his foreman, Joseph O'Leary, 
told him to go home. After Gorshen refused to 
leave the wharf, the two men struggled and 
O'Leary knocked Gorshen to the ground, ending 
the fight. Gorshen announced to everyone on 
the docks that he was going to go home, get his 
gun, and come back to kill O'Leary. After 
receiving some medical assistance at a hospital, 
Gorshen went home, cleaned and loaded his gun, 
and returned to the docks. Police officers at 
the scene stopped Gorshen and searched him for 
weapons. After an unsuccessful search, Gorshen 
was released. He immediately pulled out his gun 
and fired once at O'Leary with the police at his 
elbow.
One could hardly construct a better case of 
first-degree murder. The objective facts and 
Gorshen's declaration of his intent provided 
ample proof of premeditation and deliberation
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with malice aforethought. Yet, Dr. Bernard 
Diamond, a nationally prominent forensic psy­
chiatrist, testified that Gorshen's mental 
abnormality robbed him of his capacity to 
premeditate or entertain malice.
Dr. Diamond told the court that Gorshen 
had been suffering from chronic paranoid 
schizophrenia for twenty years prior to the 
shooting. During this period, Gorshen went into 
brief trances in which he heard voices and 
experienced visions. In some of these visions 
he saw devils in disguise committing abnormal 
sexual acts. His sexual hallucinations increased 
in frequency during the year before the homicide 
as he come to believe that he was losing sexual 
powers. Dr. Diamond explained that as these 
fears of impotency grew, Gorshen's work took on 
an exaggerated importance as a tangible proof of 
his virility.
When O'Leary ordered Gorshen to leave work, 
Gorshen saw the order as an attack on his man­
hood. According to Dr. Diamond, Gorshen was 
then confronted with two stark choices- the 
loss of his sanity or "as an alternative to 
total disintegration... (the development of) 
an obsessive murderous rage...". He stated 
that "an individual in this state will do 
anything to avoid the threatened insanity, 
and it's this element which lends strength to 
his compulsive behavior...". The defendant 
had told Dr. Diamond that at the time of the 
shooting "I forgot about God's laws and human's 
laws and everything else. The only thing was 
to get that guy...." The trial judge found the 
defendant guilty of second-degree murder 
(Arenella, 1977) .
In this case, expert testimony did not deny that Gorshen 
consciously entertained the intent to kill. Instead, Dr. 
Diamond offered an explanation as to how Gorshen's 
conscious planning of the killing was the product of 
disease process which negated or diminished Gorshen's 
volitional controls. While there may be objections to the
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expanded use of testimony in the Gorshen trial, it does 
provide a good example of how laws which allow partial 
responsibility do change the type of testimony which may be 
offered.
Thus far only mitigating defenses involving the
possibility of a mental disorder have been considered. The
Montana law for mitigated homicide also includes a 
basically sane individual who is under extreme stress. In 
these cases, an expert may be asked to render an opinion as 
to the impact of both long-term and recent life stresses, 
and how these are related to personality during a crime.
In general, a distinction needs to be drawn between 
cumulative effects of stress from a simple reliance on past 
events as mitigating. Often times the courts will allow 
the cumulative effect of a series of events when it is 
triggered by some final event in which the fatal act was an 
immediate response. In those cases where an individual has 
suffered from a number of stressful events in the past, but 
there is no final triggering event, then mitigation may not 
be accepted. Psychologists will most likely be called on 
to testify how the past life events and current stresses
interact to result in criminal behavior. The testimony
becomes similar to the dynamic explanations of behavior 
offered for mitigation involving mental disorder.
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For example, in Commonwealth vs. Carroll, a husband 
unsuccessfully invoked the heat of passion argument (Del 
Tosto 1980). A successful defense would have resulted in 
voluntary manslaughter, which is the Pennsylvania 
equivalent to mitigated homicide in Montana.
Following a lengthy argument with his 
nagging, apparently sadistic wife, and after 
she had fallen asleep, the defendant shot her 
twice in the head with a gun which had earlier 
been placed near the bed at the victim's re­
quest, The defendant's psychiatric expert 
testified that the defendant was for a number 
of years passively going along with a sit­
uation which he was not controlling and he was 
not making any decisions, and finally a 
decision was forced on him. His wife issued 
an ultimatum that if he went and gave this 
training course she would leave him. He was 
so dependant upon her he didn't want her to 
leave. He couldn't make up his mind what to 
do. He was trapped..,. Rage, desperation, 
and panic produced an impulsive automatic 
reflex type of homicide, as opposed to an 
intentional premeditated type homicide.
Other evidence involved the wife's abuse of their 
young children. The defense of voluntary manslaughter was 
not sustained because the jury rejected the expert 
testimony as showing how the cumulative stress was related 
to the crime. The fact that Mr. Carroll shot his wife 
long after an argument and after she had fallen asleep 
negated the argument that his behavior was caused by the 
stresses. There was a lack of a final event that resulted 
in an immediate response often necessary for reduced
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homicide charges.
Commonwealth v. Whitfield is another case in which 
cumulative stress was not allowed as part of a defense (Del
Tosto, 1980). In this case, Whitfield stabbed her mother's
common law husband in the throat one hour after an argument 
over a minor matter. The court found that the argument was 
not sufficient provocation for a heat of passion defense; 
which would have mitigated the charge in Pennsylvania. In 
addition, the court found that the evidence that the victim 
had sexually abused the defendant during adolescence was 
not sufficient to reduce the charge because the abuse 
occurred seven years before the homicide. Again, no clear 
link between the abuse and final provoking incident was 
provided to the court.
For comparison, a successful cumulative stress 
argument was offered in Commonwealth v, McCusker (Del
Tosto, 1980). During this trial, expert testimony was 
offered regarding the defendant's knowledge that his wife 
was intimately involved with his step-brother and might be 
carrying his child. This knowledge was the cumulative
stressor and the final provoking event was the wife's 
threat to leave Mr. McCusker moments prior to the 
homicide. In this case the immediacy of McCusker's actions 
gave more credence to the effects of cumulative stress.
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In Montana, the statutory law does not explicitly
state that stress must be accompanied by a final provoking 
event or directly related to the crime for mitigation. Yet 
these issues often become important aspects of the criminal 
proceedings in the court's attempt to define extreme
emotional stress. Therefore it becomes important for an 
expert witness to testify as to the relevance of past and 
current stresses in relation to the crime. Del Tosto 
(1980) cites three important factors in relating cumulative 
stress to a criminal act. They are as follows: (1)
whether the defendant actually acted in the heat of 
passion, (2) whether the provocation directly led to the 
killing, and (3) whether insufficient cooling time had 
elapsed, preventing the defendant from using his reasoning 
powers and capacity to reflect. These factors constitute 
an important consideration for the expert witness
testifying as to the effects of stress in a case involving 
a legally sane individual.
The above examples illustrate possible information 
that experts can offer, yet exactly what testimony is 
allowed into court varies with jurisdiction and judge. The 
actual law of evidence on admissibility of expert testimony 
seems relatively clear, although there is little uniformity 
in its application in state courts (Miller, Lower, 
Bleechmore, 1978), McCormick (1972) has stated the law of
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admissibility as follows:
An observer is qualified to testify because 
he has firsthand knowledge of the situation 
or transaction at issue. The expert has 
something different to contribute. This is 
a power to draw inferences from the facts 
which a jury would not be competent to draw.
To warrant the use of expert testimony, then, 
two elements are required. First, the subject 
of the inference must be so distinctively 
related to some science, profession, business 
or occupation as to be beyond the ken of the 
average layman. Some courts emphasize that 
the judge has discretion in administering 
this aspect of the rule, and other courts 
will admit expert opinion would still aid 
their understanding of the fact issue. This 
latter approach emphasizes the true func­
tion of expert testimony. Second, the wit­
ness must have sufficient skill, knowledge, 
or experience in that field or calling as 
to make it appear that his opinion or infer­
ence will probably aid the trier in his 
search for truth. The knowledge may in some 
fields be derived from reading alone, in 
some from practice alone, or as is more 
commonly the case, from both.
Psychologists cannot solve the court's basic dilemma 
in deciding who is guilty and if so, at what level of 
responsibility. However, the training required of a PhD, 
Psychologist renders such as a candidate for expert witness 
status. The psychological expert can assist fact finders 
(judges and jurors) by reconstructing and interpreting 
clinical aspects of past events by assessing present 
psychological functioning (Hoffman, 1981). The U.S. 
Supreme Court has given legitimacy to this form of 
testimony in the 1979 decision of Addington v. Texas. The
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court stated that cases involving a question of 
psychological disorder must be decided not so much on the 
basis of observable facts, but on facts which must be 
interpreted by expert psychiatrists and psychologists (as 
quoted in Monahan and Loftus, 1982). Thus in a mitigated 
homicide a qualified expert may be allowed to testify as to 
facts and the meaning of the facts in that particular case.
Bonnie and Slobogin (1980) have termed what the expert 
psychologist can offer the court in testimony as "informed 
speculation". They define informed speculation as the 
formation of opinions based upon training and experience 
beyond that of the layman. It lies between established 
scientific fact and mere guessing. Since cases involving 
mitigation are based upon laws which often require 
subjective inquiry, i.e., stress as a mitigating factor, 
then psychologists are a logical choice to aid in the 
inquiry. Explanatory formulations can be offered to a 
court as clinically reasonable possibilities which may not 
occur to a judge or jury. Expert testimony can also offer 
information that helps make sense of information that 
appears random or insignificant.
As an example of the utility of informed speculation, 
the case of Mr. Z wil be considered as discussed by Bonnie 
and Slobogin, 1980. Mr. Z was a twenty-three-year-old 
artist who had committed six attempted rapes over six
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years. He remembered his crimes in detail and reported 
that before each one he felt a powerful impulse. Victims 
were randomly chosen and he always became scared and 
horrified at what he was doing. Because of these feelings 
he never actually raped his victims and on two occasions
apologized after the assault.
During the interviews Mr. Z was not overtly
psychotic. The most noticeable features were feelings of 
hopelessnessr suicide, and self-hate. His feelings of 
self-hate were reported to exist as long as Mr. Z could 
remember and he had little to offer others. Corroboration 
from friends and his journals indicated social isolation, 
neglect of work and long periods of depression.
The relevant family history revealed a father who was
extremely demanding and perfectionistic. He sometimes
overreacted to minor problems and would choke his son by 
holding him up in the air by his neck. Mr. Z reported 
being terrified by these rages and recounted nightmares of 
his father’s face exploding after he transgressed.
Family history also indicated an extremely strained 
sexual relationship between his parents. Mr. Z's mother 
was repulsed by sex and rarely agreed to intercourse with 
his father. When she did submit to sexual advances she 
would call him "pig", "bastard", and other names, Mr, Z
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witnessed many of these scenes from an adjacent room and 
was severely upset by his parents' actions.
The Forensic Psychiatry Clinic at the University of 
Virginia concluded that Mr. Z was chronically depressed
through adolescence and developed abnormally low
self-esteem. They cited his father's harsh treatment and 
mother's neglect as the major causes and added the
following to their observations:
One of the characteristics of chronic depression 
in young adults is the unconscious desire to 
create situations and experiences which will 
perpetuate one's depression and masochistically 
confirm the low self-image that is inextricably 
bound up with such a depression.... Many of Z's 
acts in the past years can be seen as subliminal 
attempts at denigrating his worth as an indi­
vidual; this urge toward self-degradation was 
aimed at symbolically repeating the debasement 
Z was subjected to at the hands of his parents, 
most significantly his father.
These observations were then applied to the attempted rapes 
as follows;
Given Z's psychosexual development, the result 
of Z's drive toward self-degradation was his 
preoccupation with sexual aggression. Seeing 
his parents virtually do battle each time they 
had intercourse led Z, on an unconscious level, 
to equate sex with violence and degradation.
The attempted rapes can be seen as an impulsive 
acting out of an unconscious desire to prove 
himself a "bad" person (Bonnie and Slobogin, 1980).
The level of analysis offered begins with observed facts
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and symptoms, leads to an explanation of the symptoms, and
is followed with a hypothesis of how they may be related to
the crime. Formulations of this nature are scientifically 
unverifiable, but are based on psychodynamic theory.
However, the value of the testimony for organizing
information and offering a plausible explanation of the 
behavior should be apparent. The explanation would not be 
intuitively obvious to the layman, yet could offer 
information to better assess culpability. Bonnie and
Slobogin argue "that to the extent that the law is
interested in the psychological antecedents of a 
defendant's criminal behavior, it must give him reasonable 
opportunity to offer an explanation."
The second aspect of the law of admissibility is that 
the person must have sufficient skill, knowledge, or
experience in that field. Problems may arise when a 
psychologist is asked to testify on an issue for which he 
or she is not necessarily qualified. Psychology is a broad 
discipline with diverse specialties even at the doctoral 
level. Criticism has been leveled against the use of 
experts who may be competent as therapists, but not as 
forensic psychologists. Bonnie and Slobogin (1980) stated
their objections as thus.
Many clinicians have no business in the court­
room, Their training in clinical methods of
inquiry and treatment encourages them to err
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in the direction of diagnosing illness, invites 
many of them to speculate wildly about uncon­
scious determinants of behavior, and frequently 
discourages systematic theoretical inquiry.
Many clinicians are not sensitive to the 
limitations of their own disciplines; if they 
are not researchers, they focus on what they 
think they know rather than what they do not 
know. More important, many clinicians are 
entirely untrained in, and insensitive to, the 
purposes and limitations of the legal process.
These are serious allegations and the authors suggest 
that guidelines should be adopted to help judges evaluate 
the qualifications and techniques of prospective expert 
witnesses. Although specific guidelines were not 
recommended by Bonnie and Slobogin, the primary 
qualifications were stated as appropriate forensic training 
and experience. They suggest that the qualified expert 
should have an understanding of the difference between 
clinical and legal significance, and the relevant 
substantive law on the issue to which testimony is offered. 
They further suggest that the expert should not offer 
testimony on a person's mental condition unless a personal, 
thorough, evaluation has been conducted and targeted at the 
precise questions to which the expert will testify.
The forensic expert who is qualified to testify in 
most criminal cases would also be appropriate in cases 
involving mitigated homicide. The psychologist can testify 
in such cases when his or her knowledge and experience
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allow him to either come to a conclusion which the lay 
person cannot, or to aid the lay person in making sense of 
the information. Many cases of mitigated homicide do not 
require the testimony of an expert. The facts surrounding 
a crime may be sufficiently clear for either a charge or 
verdict of mitigated deliberate homicide. However, defense 
attorneys may choose to call an expert as a tactical 
maneuver in the trial. Expert witnesses can bring 
information into a courtroom about a defendant which would 
be considered heresay if offered from lay persons. Whether 
or not the testimony is allowed into court is again left to 
the discretion of the judge. The expert must take care not 
to overstep the boundaries of his or her testimony, A 
plausible explanation of the criminal behavior may be 
offered, but determining how exculpatory or mitigating the 
circumstances should be the province of judge and jury. 
The expert witness should be cautioned to not simply act as 
a mouthpiece for prosecution or defense, but should strive 
to integrate the information about a defendant with maximum 
objectivity.
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Relevant Research
As stated earlier in this paper, the defining 
characteristic of mitigated deliberate homicide in Montana 
is extreme mental or emotional stress. Legally, what 
constitutes stress shall be determined by a reasonable 
person in the actor's situation. The use of stress as 
mitigating opens the court to a considerable amount of 
subjectivity and ambiguity. A question may be posed about 
the legitimacy of stress to mitigate criminal 
responsibility and punishment. Is this a valid application 
of the way in which psychologists understand stress to 
affect the lives of people?
Before answering this question it is important to 
define what is meant by stress. The difficulty, however, 
is that even a cursory review of the research literature 
reveals that stress has been defined in many ways. The 
behavioral phenomena to which stress refers range wide. 
There are many 1ife-stresses such as loss of a limb, 
ill-health, poverty, and intense periods of danger such as 
combat, natural disasters, and criminal assaults. Various 
social-psychological conditions such as interpersonal 
conflict, failure, and rejection also fall under the rubric 
of stress. These phenomena differ widely both in the 
situations which give rise to them and in the responses 
which they elicit.
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McGrath (1970) stated that stress occurs when there is 
substantial imbalance between the environmental demand and 
the response capabilities of the organism. So in addition 
to behavioral phenomena, a person's capabilities must be 
considered in understanding the nature of stress, Appley 
and Trumball (1967) point out that (1) individual 
differences in reactions to situations are great, (2) that 
social context is of major importance in understanding 
stress reactions, and (3) that stress is best understood as 
an interaction of individual and situation. While agreeing 
with these basic criteria. Sells (1970) would add that 
stress occurs under two conditions. The first is when an 
individual is called to respond to a situation in which he 
has no adequate response available. The unavailability of 
the response may be due to a number of reasons such as 
physical or mental inadequacy, lack of training, or 
opportunity to prepare. The second condition is that the 
consequences of failing to respond adequately are important 
to the person. In this condition, he defines personal 
involvement as the importance of consequences to the 
individual.
Another important qualification in defining stress in 
Lazarus' (1966) concept of cognitive appraisal and 
psychological stress. In this view, the environmental 
demand creates stress when the person anticipates that he
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will not be able to cope adequately. Stress exists then 
not in an imbalance between objective demand and response 
capability, but in perceived demand and perceived response 
capability.
Other researchers have noted that the stressfulness of 
an event is inferred from the responses to the event. A 
stressor, therefore, is "that which produces stress" 
(Selye, 1976), or "a class of stimuli which are more likely 
to produce disturbance in most individuals" (Basowitz, 
Persky, Karchin, and Grinker, 1955), The problem with this 
definition is its circularity. Kahn and Quinn (1970) 
support this circular definition by regarding the response 
of an individual. That is, a stressful event produces a 
disturbed response in most or many individuals.
To summarize, stress is the result of a wide range of 
varying events. Stressful reactions occur when there is 
disparity between the demands and response capabilities or 
perceived demands and capabilities of the person. 
Generally the consequences of the event must be important 
to the organism. The stressful event has been defined as 
that which produces disturbance in many or most people, 
recognizing that there is individual and situational 
differences.
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The problem with the concept of stress in the legal 
sense is the application to the individual criminal act. 
Even though psychologists can determine that certain events 
are stressful to most/ the stressfulness is not inherent to 
an event. A person's behavior will always be an 
interaction of personality and circumstance. The
subjective distress caused by an objective stressor varies 
with the individual. It thus becomes impossible to say 
that event B has a certain mitigating power of B, A 
certain amount of subjectivity and inconsistency in 
application of the law will exist when the law is based on 
concepts that bear wide individual differences.
Research has produced some evidence to support the 
contention that as life stress increases criminal behavior 
also increases. In one study, prisoners experienced an 
increase in the frequency of life change events prior to
incarceration (Masuda, Cutler, Hein, and Holmes, 1978).
Prisoners in this study were 176 males sampled from McNeil
Island, a federal prison and the state prison of Washington 
at Walla Walla. All subjects were administered the 
Schedule of Recent Experience (SRE), a self report measure 
which asks subjects to rate life events five years prior to 
and after imprisonment. Although the conclusions are based 
on retrospective self-report data, the study does begin to 
throw light on the relationship between criminal behavior
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and stress.
In a study designed to assess the accuracy of mental 
health evaluations for predicting dangerousness it was 
discovered that incidence of stress events was 
significantly associated with dangerous behavior (Levinson 
and Ramsay, 1979). This study involved 99 clients who were 
in contact with the Emergency Mental Health Service (EMHS) 
in a large metropolitan area in the Southeast. The clients 
were chosen after coming to the attention of EMHS following 
peculiar or disruptive behavior which was suspected to be 
the result of mental disorder. Dangerousness was measured 
by both threats and actions to harm self or others. Stress 
was measured with the SRE used in the Masuda et al. study. 
Results of the study indicated that 65% of the subjects 
exhibited dangerous behavior under high stress, while 31% 
exhibited dangerous behavior under low stress.
For both of the above studies, an association between 
SRE scores and criminal or dangerous behavior does not 
necessarily indicate a causal relationship. Stressful 
events as defined by the studies could be the result of 
earlier behavior of the subjects rather than a cause of 
their present behavior. Although these studies do not 
prove that increased stress leads to increased violence, 
they do support the intuitive belief that this is the case.
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The problem is whether to consider the events as 
mitigating, aggravating, or neutral. It could be argued 
that because stressful events may contribute to criminal 
behavior that they are mitigating. Yet if they increase a 
person's dangerousness to society perhaps no consideration 
should be given to circumstances. Distinctions may need to 
be drawn between the various types of offenders. The laws 
concerning diminished responsibility may need to consider 
the difference between the antisocial individual, mentally 
unstable, and basically normal individual who is under 
extreme stress. While the courts can gain information from 
experts, these distinctions may prove too difficult to draw 
for a uniform application of law. Despite this difficulty, 
the intent of the law to gauge responsibility and sentence 
accordingly is likely to remain intact.
Perhaps the most important point to this discussion 
from a scientific viewpoint is not whether stress should or 
should not be considered mitigating. What is most 
important is the range of freedom which such terminology 
allows a jury. Brooks and Doob (1975) remind us that 
through legal history the jury has been described as 
serving one of two functions. The first function has been 
to ensure the accuracy of fact finding and to apply these 
facts to the law as given by the judge. Conversely the 
jury can be seen as an institution which has the right to
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construe or ignore a relevant rule of law so that the 
application is in accord with the notions of justice and 
fairness in the prevailing community. The use of extreme 
or emotional stress as the code governing diminished 
responsibility allows jurors to construe the law according 
to what seems most fair in a given case.
In criminal cases, a jury is very likely to consider 
the whole situation surrounding a crime in coming to a 
"just" although not always strictly legal decision. As 
specific examples, Kalven and Zeisel (1966) found that a 
jury was less likly to convict or would convict of a lesser 
offense when there was some degree of victim precipitation. 
A number of cases were also cited by Kalven and Zeisel 
where the jury seemed to acquit the defendant because he 
had suffered enough, even though he might be technically 
guilty. Finally, in some cases, the jury appears to 
consider whether or not the state deserves to win. If the 
police used unfair methods of obtaining evidence or singled 
out one person for prosecution where many appear equally 
guilty of a crime, the jury is less likely to convict. It 
appears then, that the jury injects into the legal process 
notions of fairness that are shared by the average person.
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Jury research would support the notion that non-legal 
factors influence decisions made by jurors. In a review of 
judges written reports of over 3,500 actual criminal cases, 
Kalven and Zeisel (1966) found that juries and judges 
disagreed on verdicts in about 20% of the cases. In most 
of those disagreements, the jury was more lenient than the 
judge. When queried, judges stated that the reasons for 
disagreement included defendant and victim characteristics, 
type of crime, and the jury's evaluation of that crime.
Data from other research has supported the 
observations that extra- evidential factors contribute to 
mock juror's verdicts. The research has considered a wide 
variety of potential factors which may influence jurors. 
Besides the defendant and victim characteristics of jurors, 
judges instructions regarding pretrial publicity and 
inadmissable evidence, number and severity of decision 
alternatives, jurors conceptions guilt and the size of jury 
and decision rule (Gerbasi et al., 1977). Portions of this 
research most relevant to this proposed study will be 
considered.
A study which considered the definitions of guilt as 
related to the insanity definitions was conducted by Simon 
(1967). He compared juries assignments of guilt in an 
incest case when given the M'Naghten, Durham, or no rules 
to define legal insanity. The M'Naghten rule, older and
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more widely used, states that if the defendant could not 
distinguish right from wrong at the time of the crime, he 
should be found not guilty by reason of insanity. The 
Durham rule considered more psychologically advanced states 
that the defendant is not guilty if the crime is a product 
of a mental disturbance regardless of the ability to tell 
right from wrong at the time of the crime. Results of the 
investigation were that M'Naghten juries were more likely 
to vote guilty than either the Durham or uninstructed 
juries. Simon concluded that the Durham rule was more 
similar to the public's understanding of insanity because 
the uninstructed and Durham juries gave similar responses.
Another study which considered guilt and insanity was 
that of McGlynn and Drielinger (1981). They varied sanity 
and incriminating evidence to determine the imposition of 
punishment and guilt ratings in either a sanity hearing or 
criminal trial. In their study, mock jurors read sample 
reports of an expert psychologist indicating high, medium, 
or low levels of insanity. Subjects were also given 
evidential information which was either high or low for 
incrimination. The major finding of the study was a 
difference in ratings between the sanity hearing and 
criminal trial. In the sanity hearing the level of sanity 
judgement corresponded to the level of sanity in the expert 
reports, regardless of incriminating information. This
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Page 35
result lends evidence as to the effectiveness of the 
manipulation of sanity value. In the criminal trial 
condition however, the less incriminating version of the 
facts resulted in a increased rating of insanity. McGlynn 
and Drielinger concluded that jurors were either unwilling 
or unable to disregard incriminating evidence when asked to 
make sanity judgements during a criminal case, even though 
the legal instructions required them to make such a 
distinction.
Other recent research concerned with sanity and guilt 
compared the judgements of college students and actual 
former jurors (Hinkle, Smeltzer, Allen, and King, 1983). 
In their study, subjects were presented a brief written 
account of a murder case, an explanation of the insanity 
defense, and testimony from two types of expert witness 
(psychologist or psychiatrist), and two types of testimony 
(only clinical interview or objective psychometric data). 
The expert witnesses also stated that the defendant was 
either sane or insane based on their evaluations. Results 
indicated that both students and former jurors were 
influenced by the experts determination of sanity. Thus 
when the expert concluded the defendant was sane, all 
subjects were more likely to return a sane verdict and when 
the expert concluded the defendant was insane the subjects 
were more likely to return an insane verdict. All
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interactions were consistent with this main effect except 
one. Those former jurors which heard the psychologist 
presenting only objective data were more likely to rate the 
defendant as sane regardless of the expert's conclusion. 
Students perception of insanity was not influenced by the 
psychologist x objective testimony condition.
The other major result of the study was that students 
were more lenient than former jurors, that is the students 
gave more insane, less guilty ratings. The authors 
concluded that research using only college students as 
jurors may lack generalizabilty to other populations. 
However, it is encouraging that patterns of response were 
for the most part similar between jurors and students. The 
possibility that former jurors experience in the courtroom 
may have made them more conservative than other 
non-students was not addressed.
In actual trials, it has been observed that when only 
two extreme choices are allowed by juries (e.g. first 
degree murder vs. not guilty), then the jury will more
likely choose the more lenient choice (Vidmar, 1972). This
observation was experimentally tested by Vidmar. In his 
study, undergraduates were asked to reach verdicts for a 
defendant being tried for robbery and murder. There were 
seven decision alternatives in the study: 1) first degree
murder or not guilty; 2) second degree murder or not
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guilty, 3) manslaughter or not guilty, 4) first degree
murder, second degree murder or not guilty; 5) first
degree murder, manslaughter or not guilty; 6) second
degree murder, manslaughter or not guilty; 7) first degree 
murder, second degree murder, manslaughter or not guilty. 
Each degree of guilt was assigned a mandatory sentence. No 
effects due to sex of subjects or order of testimony 
presentation was found. However, there was support for the 
original hypothesis in that the condition which compared 
the most and least severe guilt conditions resulted in the 
highest number of not guilty verdicts.
In a similar study, Kaplan and Simon (1972) presented
student jurors with a case involving a death in a car 
accident. Jurors were asked to assign a verdict in 
one-of-four conditions: 1) first degree murder or not
guilty; 2) second degree murder or not guilty; 3)
manslaughter or not guilty; 4) a choice of any 4 verdicts. 
Strength of evidence and race were also included in the
design. Results indicated that stronger evidence resulted 
in more guilty verdicts. No differences were reported for 
race at a .05 level. The first choice between first degree 
murder and not guilty produced the most number of not
guilty verdicts and the four choice conditions produced the 
least. The number of not guilty choices in the other two 
choices fell between these extremes. The studies of Vidmar
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(1972) and Kaplan and Simon (1972) indicate that trial 
outcomes can be influenced by the verdict choices given to 
the juries.
In a study involving alcohol intoxication, Sobell and 
Sobell (1975) hypothesized that an individuals conception 
of intoxication would be related to a decision regarding 
punishment for a crime in which the defendant was 
intoxicated. Results of their study indicated that 
subjects assigned more severe penalties for premeditated 
and recidivistic crimes and less severe penalties for 
unplanned crimes. When the defendant was portrayed as an 
alcoholic the subjects were divided between assignment of 
more or less severe punishment. An unexpected result of 
this study was that even when subjects believed that the 
defendant was not in control of his drinking nor 
responsible for his behavior, they did not assign less 
severe penalties. Instead, this group of subjects assigned 
more severe penalties than other groups. Sobell and Sobell 
attempt to explain their results by hypothesizing that 
subjects were assigning punishment as a protective measure 
rather than adjusting punishment to the level of 
responsibility. That is, more punishment was assigned to 
those viewed as more dangerous, not those viewed as more 
responsible for his actions.
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In a study of judges actual sentencing, Hagan (1975) 
found that severity of crime was the best predictor for 
amount of sentence. Judges in this study were identified 
as two types: those strongly favoring law and order and
those less concerned about law and order. Judges of the 
strong law and order variety sentenced primarily on the
definitions of offense seriousness. Those judges less 
concerned with law and order were more influenced by 
defendant characteristics such as race, prior record, and 
number of charges against the offender. The latter group 
of judges were also found to provide more lenient treatment 
to minority offenders. It was hypothesized that judges not 
as concerned with law and order allowed the backgrounds of 
the defendants to mitigate their sentences. These results 
disagreed with previous research which suggests that 
minorities were given more harsh penalties (Southern 
Regional Council, 1969 and Wolfgang and Riedel, 1973, as 
referenced by Hagan, 1975) . The generalizability of
Hagan’s results are unclear, however, as the study was 
conducted in Canada and the minority offenders were Indian 
and Metis (the latter being half Indian and half 
Caucasian).
Barrel (1981) is another Canadian researcher who
considered offense seriousness as a predictor of sentencing 
severity. He examined 628 presentence reports filed from
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1970 to 1975 in Edmonton, Alberta. His findings indicated 
that there was an interaction between alcohol consumption 
and offense seriousness. For the least serious crimes, 
alcohol consumption resulted in less severe sentences. 
However, as the seriousness of the crime increased, the 
mitigating effect of alcohol was reversed. Consumption of 
alcohol in serious crimes resulted in more severe 
sentences. Remorse of the offender was also an important 
variable in Barrel's study. He found that remorsefulness 
resulted in more lenient treatment for offenders with few 
alcohol related convictions. However, those with an 
extensive prior history of alcohol convictions (in this 
case 3 or more) were assigned more severe penalties.
Research regarding the influence of the sex of the 
jurors is mixed. Some of the studies have shown that males 
are more punitive. In a study involving various role play 
situations, Kerr, Nerenz, and Herrick (1976) found males as 
more likly to convict. Simon (1967) reported that males 
were more conviction prone in a housebreaking case. Males 
were also found to be more punitive in cases of 
homosexuality or resisting arrest (Steffenmeier, 1977).
Other studies have shown females to be more conviction 
prone. Griffit and Jackson (1973) reported that females 
were more punitive in a negligent automobile homicide case. 
Mistretta (1977) found females to be more punitive on a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Page 41
number of crimes using multidimensional scaling. In a 
purse-snatching case, Austin, Walster, and Utne (1976) 
reported that females were more punitive. One consistent 
finding is that females are more conviction prone in cases 
of rape (Rumsey and Rumsey, 1977; Miller and Hewitt, 1978; 
Davis, Kerr, Atkin, Holt, and Meek, 1975) and more punitive 
(Scroggs, 1976; Howitt, 1974). Consistent with these 
studies is a finding by Simon (1967) that females were more 
punitive in a case of incest.
Some studies have obtained no sex differences. In 
homicide cases, Vidmar (1972) and Nemeth, Endicott, and 
Wachtler (1976) found no sex differences. Steffensmeier
(1977) found no sex differences for cases of homicide, 
child beating, embezzlement, public drunkeness, and 
shoplifting.
In general, cases that have shown the most clear sex 
differences are those which have involved women as victims. 
In these cases, women were more punitive and conviction 
prone. The other studies have shown mixed results with 
regard to sex differences and are more difficult to 
interpret.
In summary, the above studies present information 
regarding factors that influence determinations of guilt 
and sentencing. Yet little work has been done which
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specifically assesses the relative mitigating effects of 
expert testimony as related to various points of law. 
Perhaps this is due to the relative newness of partial 
responsibility in our legal system or to the complexity of 
the topic. The effects of various types of testimony on 
jurors making decisions regarding levels of responsibility 
is a logical place to begin research. A study designed to
assess what factors people consider mitigating could be a
start to understanding the pattern of evidentiary factors 
which distinguish between successful and unsuccessful 
claims of diminished responsibility. Information in this 
area could eventually be used to aid legislators, judges, 
and attorneys, in their attempts to form, interpret and 
execute the law.
In preparation for this research, a pilot study was 
conducted to explore possible mitigating factors of
homicide. Montana law governing homicide was chosen
because of its use of extreme mental or emotional stress to 
constitute mitigated homicide. It was believed that this 
construct was sufficiently psychological to involve expert 
witnesses in many cases. Subjects were 171 student 
volunteers, approximately half male, half female, from 
introductory psychology classes at the University of 
Montana. A list of 22 potentially mitigating circumstances 
was generated from the literature on diminished
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responsibility (Appendix A) . Each subject was asked to 
rate potential mitigating circumstances on a one to seven 
Likert-type scale. The ratings were then factor-analyzed 
to produce factors of mitigation (Appendix B). Individual 
correlations of .45 were used as the significant cut-off 
values. The results of the factor analysis were very 
clean. Each individual variable correlated with only one 
factor above the .45 cutoff. Furthermore, each variable 
correlated with at least one factor above the same .45 
cutoff. Thus each variable was included in one and only 
one factor. The results of the study yielded five factors.
The first four factors were labelled as such: 1) Traumatic
Childhood, 2) Mental Illness, 3) Recent Stress and 4) 
Substance Abuse. Only two variables, lack of sleep and 
overdependence on spouse, loaded on the fifth factor. 
Since the correlation of these variables did not make 
intuitive sense, the fifth factor was considered difficult 
to interpret and was not named. Since no conclusions can 
be drawn from this study regarding the relative mitigating 
values of the above factors further research is warranted. 
The present investigation will be an attempt to isolate and 
measure reactions of subject jurors when faced with
information from one of the above factors in a homicide
case.
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Past jury research has been criticized for failing to 
obtain verdict data (Kerr 1978). Among reasons for this 
failure are the difficulties with analysis of dichotomous 
data and the greater sensitivity of multivalued scales. It 
has often been assumed that verdicts, sentences, ratings of 
guilt-innocence, and so forth all reflected a single 
underlying disposition. However, when testing a 
severity-criterion hypothesis of penalty assignment, Kerr
(1978) found a contradiction between dichotomous and 
continuous measures. For example, increasing the penalty 
for a crime lowered the probability of conviction 
(dichotomous measure), but did not effect ratings of guilt 
(continuous measure). Thus, it can be misleading to assume 
that verdicts and assigned level of guilt are a single 
judgmental process. The present investigation will include 
both dichotomous and continuous measures to allow 
measurement of more than one decision making dimension.
Another criticism of jury research has been the lack 
of group deliberation. This criticism is cited as a 
potential limiting factor in generalizing results. Yet, 
existing research on group decision-making process (Davis, 
Kerr, Atkin, Holt, and Meek, 1975) and actual jury outcome 
(Kalven and Zeisel, 1966) suggests that juries almost 
always select the verdict favored by a sizeable majority 
before deliberation (Kerr, 1978). Davis et al. (1975)
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derived the following rule from their study: "If the jury
has a two-thirds majority or greater for a verdict
alternative, the jury will eventually, endorse that 
verdict, but if there is no such majority initially, the 
jury will hang" (p. 1440, Kerr, 1978). In conclusion, the
above studies suggests that a researcher can make educated 
probability statements about the outcome of jury 
deliberation from the knowledge of individual juror
behavior. Although the issue of predicting jury outcome
from individual juror response is not entirely settled, 
this study will only consider the data gathered from 
individual jurors.
Perhaps the most consistent and important criticism 
leveled against jury research in the recent past has been
the dubious generalizability of the findings. The level of
complexity inherent to any courtroom trial is difficult to 
simulate in laboratory settings. Researchers thus far have
adopted the obvious strategy of studying only selected
features of the trial process. Yet this approach has come 
under significant attack from recent researchers (Gerbasi 
et al., 1977; Weiten and Diamond, 197 9; and Monahan and 
Loftus, 1982). Most of the issues and specific criticisms 
against jury research are similar to criticisms generally 
leveled against analogue research in social psychology.
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Monahan and Loftus (1982) take the position that the 
relative merits of laboratory vs. field research depends 
upon the purpose for which the research is undertaken. 
When an investigator is concerned mainly with predicting 
the actual behavior of legal decision makers, then the 
issue external validity weighs more heavily. Here, 
naturalistic investigations or very natural simulations 
would be the methods of choice. However, when an 
investigator's purpose is to test a theory or explore new 
variables, then concerns with internal validity are 
important. Controlled laboratory studies are best at 
maximizing internal validity.
The question is often asked whether unrealistic 
simulations can ever provide results which are useful to 
later prediction. Yet, this question in and of itself may 
be inappropriate. Research may be useful to later 
understanding if it shows what can occur in natural 
settings. Ideas can be developed from research which later 
leads to useful theory or explanation without having any 
immediate direct generalizability (Mook, 1983). Thus, what 
may be most important is choosing a design which will best 
answer the questions of the researcher, not necessarily any 
immediate practical implications of the results. External 
validity may often be an important concern for follow- up 
empirical research.
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The present investigation will be designed to consider 
some new variables in a simulated jury study. Factors will 
be assembled in such a way that is unlikely in a natural 
setting. The direct generalizability of the results to 
other trials will be therefore limited and dependant on 
further empirical research. The focus will be upon the 
possible differences that various emphases of psychological 
stress can have on a person's decisions regarding guilt and 
responsibility.
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Design
This study employed a 2x2x5 factorial design. The 
three factors investigated were sex of subject, type of 
crime and type of mitigating testimony. The type of crime 
consisted of either a homicide involving a husband and wife 
or a homicide involving two friends in a bar. The type of
testimony consisted of one of the following: a) Traumatic
Childhood, b) Mental Illness, c) Recent Stress, d)
Substance Abuse, and e) Antisocial Personality. The fifth 
factor of Antisocial Personality was to serve as a control 
for the mitigating factors. This was a between groups 
design in which subjects were randomly assigned to one of 
twenty cells.
subjeçtg
Subjects were 240 male and female undergraduate 
volunteers enrolled in an introductory psychology course at 
the University of Montana. Each subject received 
experimental credit in return for his/her participation.
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Each subject received a booklet containing an 
introductory paragraph (Appendix C), the legal definition 
of homicide in Montana (Appendix D), a summary of the crime 
(Appendix E or F) , a written copy of expert testimony 
(Appendixes G, H, I, J, K, L) and a response questionnaire 
(Appendix M ) . The introductory paragraph explained the 
experimental task. Subjects were told that their reactions 
would be compared to those of actual jurors in order to 
increase careful consideration of their responses.
Subjects were run in small groups. Case material and 
response questionnaires were combined into booklets. To 
randomize, booklets were shuffled and handed out to 
subjects as they took their seats. Separate boxes were 
kept for males and females to insure an equal number of 
each sex per cell. Subjects read the trial material and 
responded individually. When finished, subjects were asked 
to make a dichotomous judgement between Deliberate Homicide 
and Mitigated Deliberate Homicide. Subjects were then 
asked to rate the following on an 11 point Likert-type 
scale: a) amount of sentence, b) level of responsibility,
c)level of stress, d) liklihood of future crime, and e) 
perception of testimony as real or not. Following these
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scales, subjects were asked to describe the most important 
factors in determining a verdict and sentence. The next 
question asked subjects to list any additional items of 
evidence which they felt would have been helpful in making 
their decisions.
The subjects were then asked to provide basic 
demographic data, and information regarding previous jury 
experience. They were also asked whether they or someone 
close to them had been a victim of a serious violent crime 
and if so, the nature of the crime and how long ago it 
occured. When all subjects were finished they were 
debriefed as to the procedure and purpose of the study. 
Subjects were allowed to ask questions during the 
debriefing. It was then emphasized that students should 
not discuss the study with anyone because of the 
possibility of contamination. Before being dismissed, 
students were asked to sign a statement promising not to 
discuss the research for one month.
Data Analysis
The first dependent measure was a dichotomous variable 
involving the verdict choice as either Deliberate or 
Mitigated Deliberate Homicide. A multivariate chi-square 
analysis was used to evaluate these results. The remaining 
continuous measures were analyzed through Analysis of
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Variance. Five separate factorial ANOVA procedures were 
conducted, one for each of the continuous measures. A 
Newman-Kuels multiple comparison procedure was used to 
compare the levels within any significant interactions.
Hypotheses
Experimental research in the area of diminished 
responsibility and expert testimony was so new that 
predictions were difficult. The proposed investigation was 
exploratory and therefore the hypotheses were tentative. 
The tests of significance were non-directional.
Hinkle et al. (1983) found that college students were 
more lenient in their judgments than former jurors, Vidmar 
(1972) and Kaplan and Simon (1972) demonstrated that when 
faced with a dichotomous verdict decision that students 
were more likely to choose the lenient verdict. Thus it 
was hypothesized that the combined proportion of Mitigated 
Deliberate Homicide verdicts would be larger than .50. 
Further, it was hypothesized that the proportion of 
Mitigated verdicts for the comparison condition of 
Antisocial Personality would be lower than the proportions 
of each of the stress factors.
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On the basis of the findings of Barrel (1981) it was 
predicted that the Substance Abuse condition would result 
in higher ratings of responsibility and punishment and 
lower ratings of stress than the other three experimental 
factors. It was also predicted that the Antisocial 
Personality condition would result ratings of 
responsibilityr punishment, and likelihood of another crime 
and lower ratings of stress than the four experimental 
factors.
Also expected was that the Domestic Homicide condition 
would result in lower ratings of responsibility than the 
Bar Scene crime. The only expected sex difference was that 
males would be more lenient in the Domestic Crime situation 
than females. No difference was expected for the Bar Scene 
crime.
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One dichotomous measure and five continuous measures 
were utilized in this study. Data for the dichotomous 
measure were analyzed using a chi-square while the
continuous measures were analyzed with a 2x2x5 analysis of 
variance. The dichotomous measure asked subjects to assign 
a verdict of either Mitigated Deliberate Homicide or
Deliberate Homicide. Of the 240 subjects in the study, 162 
chose the Mitigated verdict and 78 chose the Deliberate 
verdict. Thus the Mitigated to Deliberate ratio was 
slightly greater than 2:1, at a proportion of ,675 in favor 
of the Mitigated verdict. No significant differences for 
the verdict emerged for Sex (1L^(1)=.08, J2>.05) or Type of 
Crime (1)=.30, p>.05). There was a significant
difference for verdict assignment based on Type of Expert 
Testimony (X^ (4)=12.08, #<.05). The number of Mitigated 
vs. Deliberate verdicts chosen by subjects in each of the 
five Type of Expert Testimony conditions are presented in 
Figure 1. Individual chi-square tests performed between 
the Types of Expert Testimony revealed that the Traumatic 
Childhood condition resulted in significantly more 
Mitigated in verdicts than the Substance Abuse and
Antisocial conditions. The Mental Illness condition also 
had significantly more Mitigated Verdicts than the
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Figure 1: Frequencies of Mitigated and Deliberate Verdicts for Type of
Expert Testimony
G
<vwoJCu
to■pu■H
<V-P(0po
g
tn>
t0)•ptotn
pCDne3Z
40 -
35
30
25 -
20 ■
15
10
Mitigated Verdicts
Deliberate Verdicts
 1 -
Traumatic 
Childhood 
(N = 48)
 —
Mental 
Illness 
(N = 48)
4-
Current 
Stress 
(N = 48)
Substance 
Abuse 
(N = 48)
Antisocial 
Persona ] it; 
(N = 48)
Type of Expert Testimony
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Page 55
Antisocial Condition,
The first continuous measure combined the number of 
years of suggested sentencing for both Deliberate and 
Mitigated verdicts to yield one "relative amount of 
sentencing" score. A significant main effect for Type of 
Testimony was obtained on this measure ( _F=4.74, df=4.220.
JL<.001) (see Table 1). A Neuman-Keuls pairwise comparisons 
procedure found that the amount of punishment suggested for 
the comparison group. Antisocial Personality, was 
significantly higher than that for the Current Stress and 
Substance Abuse conditions. The Traumatic Childhood 
condition was rated similar to the Antisocial Personality 
group but was significantly higher than both the Current 
Stress and Substance Abuse conditions. However, no 
significant differences were obtained between Mental 
Illness and the other conditions. Scores for the Mental 
Illness condition fell in the middle as they were lower 
than the Antisocial and Traumatic Childhood Groups, but 
higher than the Substance Abuse and Current Stress groups. 
No main effects for either Sex (E|=1.5, dfj=l,220, _pr• 22) or 
Type of Crime (Domestic vs. Bar Scene) (£=.007, _dfj=l, 220, 
p=.951 were obtained on this measure. There were no 
significant interactions.
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The second continuous measure attempted to assess 
ratings about the personal vs. situational responsibility 
for the defendant's actions. No significant main effects 
or interactions were obtained on this measure (Table 2). 
The overall mean score for this measure was 4.7 on an 11 
point scale. This score is in the direction of a 
situational attribution for the defendant's responsibility, 
tables
The defendant's amount of stress at the time of the 
crime was assessed by the third continuous measure. There 
were no significant main effects or interactions for Sex or 
Type of Expert Testimony on this variable. One significant 
main effect did emerge for Type of Crime (F.=4.30, df=1,220, 
_p.<.05) (Table 3). Subjects rated the defendant in the 
Domestic situation as under more stress than the defendant 
in the Bar situation (M=7 .38, 6.88 respectively). The
overall mean for this measure was 7,13 on an 11 point scale 
which suggests the subjects rated the defendants as being 
under a moderately high level of stress.
On the fourth continuous measure subjects were asked 
to rate the liklihood of the defendant committing a similar 
crime in the future. No significant differences were 
reported for Sex (El=.003, df = l, 220, fi=.95) or Type of Crime 
(£=.85, 220, 4i=.64). A significant main effect was
again found for Type of Expert Testimony (£=10.04, df=4,
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Table 2: 2 X 2 X 5  Analysis of Variance
Variable: Focus of Responsibility
Source of Variance Sums of Squares Mean Square F Ratio Probability
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p.<.001) (Table 4). The Neuman-Keuls pairwise comparisons 
procedure found that the subjects rated the defendant under 
the Antisocial condition as more likely to commit a similar 
crime in the future than the defendants in any other 
condition. Defendants in both the Mental Illness and 
Traumatic Childhood conditions were rated as significantly 
more likely to commit a similar future crime than those in 
the Current Stress condition. No other significant results 
were obtained.
The fifth continuous measure was designed as a 
manipulation check. Subjects were asked to rate how 
realistic the expert testimony was in the various 
conditions. No significant main effects were obtained for 
any of the three factors (Table 5), The overall mean score 
was 3.38 on an 11 point scale. These results are in the 
realistic direction and support the contention that the 
manipulations were not differentially credible.
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Table 4: 2 X 2 X 5  Analysis of Variance 
Variable: Liklihood of Future Crime
Mean Ratings 
Experimental Groups
Male
Female
Domestic
Bar
Traumatic Childhood 
Mental Illness 
Current Stress 
Substance Abuse 
Antisocial Personality
Mean
5.50
5.29
5.15
5.45
5.59
5.54
5.79
4.52
6.96
Source of Variance Sums of Squares M Mean Square F Ratio Probability
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Table 5; 2 X 2 X 5  Analysis of Variance 
Variable: Expert Testimony as Realistic
Mean Ratings
Experimental Groups
Male
Female
Domestic
Bar
Traumatic Childhood 
Mental Illness 
Current Stress 
Substance Abuse 
Antisocial Personality
Mean
5.49
5.27
5.25
5.51
5.58 
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5.95 
2.88
Source of Variance Sums of Squares W Mean Square F Ratio Probability
Sex (S) 5.04 1 5.04 .56 .558
Type of Crime (TC) 4.00 1 4.00 .74 .604
Type of Testimony (TT) 28.68 4 7.17 1.52 .265
S X TC 8.45 1 8.44 1.55 .211
S X TT 17.15 4 4/29 .79 .556
TC X TT 56.60 4 9.15 1.68 .154
S X TC X TT 50.50 4 7.62 1.40 .255
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The present study was designed to investigate the 
possible mitigating effects of various psychological and 
life event factors in a jury trial. The factors were 
empirically derived in pilot work previous to this 
research.The first hypothesis of this study had two 
components. The first was that the Mitigated Deliberate 
Homicide Verdicts would be chosen at a higher than ,50 
proportion. Results from this study support the
hypothesis. This finding is consistent with the results of 
Vidmar (1972) and Kaplan and Simon (1972) which 
demonstrated that jurors were more likely to choose a 
lenient verdict when faced with a dichotomous choice.
The second component to the first hypothesis stated 
that the Antisocial comparison condition would result in a 
lower proportion of Mitigated to Deliberate verdicts than 
each of the stress conditions. The results of this study 
only partially support this component of the hypothesis.
The Antisocial condition had significantly fewer Mitigated 
verdicts than the Traumatic Childhood and Mental Illness 
conditions. There were also fewer Mitigated verdicts for 
the Antisocial condition than for the Current Stress and
Substance Abuse conditions, but the differences were not
statistically significant. An evaluation of the hypothesis
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that the Antisocial Condition would result in fewer 
Mitigated verdicts can also be made by considering 
predictions about group deliberation. Although only data 
on individual juror verdicts were collected, research cited 
in the introduction by Davis et al. (1975) allows some 
prediction about group deliberated verdicts based on the 
individual verdict choices. The rule derived by the Davis 
et al. study was stated by Kerr (p.1440, 1978) as follows ; 
"If the jury has a two-thirds majority or greater for a 
verdict alternative, the jury will eventually, endorse that 
verdict, but if there is no such majority initially, the 
jury will hang". Utilizing this two-thirds rule derived by 
the Davis et al. study, some predictions about group 
outcome can be offered. If all subjects in the study are 
considered, the proportion of Mitigated verdicts is 67.5. 
This number is borderline to the cut-off, but suggests that 
the overall effect of testimony toward mitigation was 
fairly potent. It is hard to predict the outcome of group 
deliberation for this overall proportion because subjects 
based their judgments on differing testimonies. The 
breakdown of groups by various types of expert testimony 
makes for clearer predictions. Two conditions, the 
Traumatic Childhood and Mental Illness, had proportions of 
Mitigated to Deliberate verdicts of .81 and .77 
respectively. These proportions are clearly above the 
Davis .67 cutoff. Thus it is logically probable that these
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conditions would have resulted in a Mitigated verdict after 
group deliberation. The Current Stress and Substance Abuse 
conditions had proportions of .65 and ,63 respectively and 
the proportion for the Antisocial was .52. Since the 
proportions for these three conditions fall below the 
cutoff it does not appear that they would have resulted in 
Mitigated verdicts after group deliberation. However the 
proportions for the Current Stress and Substance Abuse 
conditions are close to the cutoff and would have a higher 
proDability of resulting in a group verdict of Mitigated 
Homicide than the Antisocial condition. Thus the data on 
predictions of group verdicts also partially supports the 
hypothesis that the Antisocial condition would have fewer 
Mitigated verdicts than the other conditions.
The continuous measures in this study did not 
distinguish any conditions as differing in amount of 
personal vs. situational responsibility or in amount of 
stress. The natural question to ask then is what caused 
the differences which did emerge? One possible way to 
consider these results is suggested by the order in which 
the conditions fell for verdict assignment. The order from 
most to least number of Mitigating verdicts was Traumatic 
Childhood, Mental Illness, Current Stress, Substance Abuse 
and Antisocial, It may be that the defendants in the more 
mitigating conditions were viewed by subjects as less
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responsible for the development of their problems, yet not 
necessarily less responsible for their actions. If this is 
the case then subjects may have either felt a little more
sorry for the defendant in the Traumatic Childhood or
Mental Illness conditions or believed that these people 
were in some sense victims themselves. Either could 
explain a greater tendency toward the mitigated verdict. 
Further research would be needed to substantiate the
possibility of these explanations since they were not 
directly measured in this study.
Another important part of this investigation was the 
use of an expert witness to present the relevant material 
from the various factors. As a whole, results from this 
study can be interpreted to support previous findings that 
an expert's opinion is accepted by jurors and can play an 
important part in the perception of trial material. The
subjects rated each of the five types of expert testimony 
as believable with no significant differences between the 
conditions. Furthermore, in each of the conditions, the 
expert stated that the defendant was suffering from a 
considerable amount of psychological stress at the time of 
the crime. Subject ratings of the defendant's stress level 
were relatively high across all conditions and there was 
again no significant difference between these conditions. 
Since the subject ratings of stress were high across all
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the conditions, it seems reasonable to conclude that these 
ratings were not based on the the different testimonies 
offered by the expert. Rather it is more reasonable to 
conclude that the subjects ratings corresponded to the
specific statement of the expert that the defendant was 
suffering from a "considerable amount of psychological 
stress". This statement was made prior to more specific 
testimony in the transcripts and was common to all five of 
the different expert testimonies. However, because the 
amount of stress stated by the expert was not
systematically varied in this study, the above observation 
must again be interpreted cautiously. It may be that the 
correspondence was an artifact of the design or due to 
another factor. However, the studies by McGlynn and
Drielinger (1981) and Hinkle et al. (1983) found that 
juror ratings of sanity corresponded well to the statements 
made by expert witnesses. Their results lend some credence 
to the interpretation that the high ratings of stress and 
lack of variability between groups was due to the influence 
of the expert's statement about stress.
The expert witness seemed to have a similar impact on 
subject ratings of defendant responsibility. The overall 
ratings were weighted in the direction of situational 
responsibility rather than personal responsibility to 
account for the defendant’s actions. This result runs
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counter to the widely supported contention first offered by 
Jones and Nisbett (1971) that people generally account for 
the behavior of others in terms of stable personal 
characteristics, not situational parameters. Thus the 
situational focus of the expert testimonies seems to have 
also shifted the attributions of jurors from internal to 
external explanations for behavior. In most court cases 
this effect may be countered by testimony of opposing 
experts or witnesses. However, there are cases in which 
only one expert is present or in which there is no 
disagreement between experts on aspects of the case. 
Regardless of some limits, this finding can be interpreted 
to support the importance of expert testimony for 
influencing jurors. Again this interpretation is offered 
as a cautious but plausible explanation of the data. There 
was no systematic manipulation of expert focus as related 
to subject's assignments of responsibility. Further 
research would be warranted to rule out rival explanations 
of the data.
The second stated hypothesis of this study consisted 
of two aspects. The first aspect of the hypothesis 
predicted that the Substance Abuse condition would result 
in higher ratings of responsibility and punishment and 
lower ratings of stress than the other three experimental 
conditions. The second aspect of the hypothesis was that
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the Antisocial Personality condition would result in higher 
ratings of responsibility, punishment, and liklihood of 
another crime and lower ratings of stress than the other 
four conditions. The predictions for responsibility and 
stress were not supported by the results for either the 
Substance Abuse or the Antisocial condition. The 
hypothesis concerning greater punishment for the Substance 
Abuse condition was also not supported. Results partially 
supported the predictions that the defendant in the 
Antisocial condition would be given higher punishment and 
be perceived as more likely to commit a future crime.
This pattern of results can be best explained from two 
observations about the data. The first observation comes 
from the information already presented about the effects of 
the expert witness. As previously proposed, the subjects 
ratings of stress and responsibility seem to have been 
influenced most by specific statements of the expert that 
were common to all the conditions. If these specific 
statements were indeed more influential to the ratings than 
the general elements of the testimony, then this would 
account for the lack of difference between conditions. 
Furthermore, since the ratings for stress and 
responsibility did not significantly differ between any 
condition, they cannot account for any differences found on 
measures of suggested punishment or the liklihood of future
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crime.
What does seem plausible is that the amount of 
sentencing and judgment about liklihood of future crime are 
related. The Antisocial condition was rated highest for 
liklihood of future crime, and highest for amount of 
punishment. The Traumatic Childhood was rated as second 
highest for punishment and third for liklihood of future 
crime, while the Mental Illness condition was third and 
second for these ratings. Although not all the differences 
between groups resulted in significant effects, the trend 
does support a relationship between these variables. This 
observation is consistent with the research of Sobell and 
Sobell (1975) who hypothesized that the assignment of 
punishment was a protective measure rather than an 
adjustment to the level of responsibility. In their study, 
the alcoholic was assigned more punishment and viewed as 
not in control of his drinking, or put another way, as more 
likely to get drunk again. It was on this basis that the 
more severe punishment ratings for the Substance Abuse 
condition were hypothesized for the present study. Yet in 
this study, the defendant was not described as an habitual 
abuser. The ratings for the liklihood of committing a 
similar crime in the future were relatively mild for the 
condition (4.5 on an 11 point scale). Therefore the lack 
of support for the hypothesis which predicted more
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punishment for Substance Abuse over the other stress 
factors is not surprising.
In general, the results so far confirm the finding of 
Kerr (1978), which suggests that dichotomous and continuous 
measures do not necessarily reflect a single judgmental 
process. For example, on the dichotomous verdict measure. 
Traumatic Childhood was treated with the most lenience. 
Yet, for amount of punishment the Traumatic Childhood 
condition was second highest to the Antisocial condition. 
These differences for the Traumatic Childhood condition 
would not be expected if there was a single judgmental 
process. For this study it was suggested that judgments 
for the dichotomous measure (Mitigated vs. Deliberate 
Homicide) may have been influenced by perceptions about the 
defendant's own contribution to his stressful situation. 
On the continuous measure, the perceptions about a person's 
dangerousness was proposed as an important element to the 
decision.
A third hypothesis stated for this study was that the 
Domestic Homicide condition would result in lower ratings 
of responsibility than the Bar Scene condition. This 
result did not occur and again may be due to the expert 
witness' equalizing effect on the ratings of 
responsibility. One significant result did emerge in 
comparing the Domestic to Bar Scene homicides. The
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defendants in the Domestic Scene were rated as being under 
more stress than in the Bar Scene. This result contradicts 
other findings in which there were no significant 
differences on ratings of stress. An interpretation of 
this result is difficult to make. It is not clear whether 
a domestic crime would generally be viewed as more 
stressful or if the domestic scene as operationalized in 
this study is more stressful. A manipulation check similar 
to the one used for the expert testimony could have been an 
aid to interpretation and should have been included in the
data collection. However, the difference was not
particularly large (M = 7.38, 6.88) and did not appear to 
significantly influence the results for other measures.
A fourth hypothesis in this study predicted an 
interaction between Sex and Type of Crime. It was
hypothesized that males would be more lenient in the
domestic crime situation than females. This prediction was 
not substantiated by any of the measures. Again this lack 
of support for the hypothesis is difficult to interpret. 
Perhaps the focus upon the defendant's problems in this 
study prevented female subjects from necessarily 
identifying as much as expected with the female victim in 
the Domestic condition.
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Overall, the results of this research can be viewed as 
supportive of some previous findings. Strong differences 
based on the unique elements of the stress conditions did 
not emerge. Rather, what seemed to influence the results 
were perceptions about the defendant's responsibility for 
the development of problems which led to stress and 
perceptions of future dangerousness. Both of these 
conclusions are offered only as a plausible explanation of 
the data. Since this study did not anticipate these 
explanations, they were not systematically controlled or 
manipulated and cannot be accepted unequivocally. Both of 
the above decision making dimensions could provide material 
for future research.
It is also important to note that the amount of stress 
was not varied in this study. That is, since the various 
conditions were perceived as not differing in stress levels 
then this factor cannot account for significant 
differences. Future research could address possible 
effects of different amounts of stress for the different 
factors. For example, it might be that as perceived stress 
for a given crime increases, then predictions about future 
dangerousness may decrease.
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Another fruitful area of research suggested by this 
study concerns various parameters of expert credibility. 
Because this study used only one expert, nothing can be 
said about the effects of using opposing expert testimony. 
It may be that jurors average the information and thus the 
witnesses cancel each other. Another possibility is that 
subjects may choose one or the other witness and base their 
judgments largely on the testimony of one, A question 
about differences in the credibility between an expert and 
a lay witness could also be approached. Is the expert 
necessarily believed if there is discrepancy? If so, for 
what areas does this hold true? It could also be 
informative to gather information about this study and 
suggested research ideas from other populations.
Before concluding, the reader is reminded that this 
study was designed as exploratory in nature. The various 
factors were assembled in a way that is unlikely in an 
actual courtroom. Therefore the direct generalizability of 
the results to actual juries is uncertain and remains open 
to empirical validation.
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Swipagy
This study employed a 2 X 2 X 5 factorial design. 
Male and female subjects were presented with written case 
materials that varied by Type of Crime and Type of Expert 
Testimony, The Type of Crime was either a homicide 
involving a husband and wife or a homicide involving two 
friends in a bar. The Type of Expert Testimony was one of 
the following: A) Traumatic Childhood B) Mental Illness,
C) Recent Stress, D) Substance Abuse, and E) Antisocial 
Personality.
Each of the subjects made a dichotomous choice between 
Deliberate or Mitigated Deliberate Homicide. They then 
rated the following continuous measures on an 11-point 
Likert-type scale: A) amount of sentence, B) level of
responsibility, C) level of stress, D) liklihood of future 
crime, and E) perception of testimony as real or not.
Results of this study were interpreted to support 
previous research that student are more likely to choose a 
lenient verdict when making a dichotomous choice. Possible 
reasons for this may be that alternative juries are less 
likely to convict in general or it may be that students are 
relatively liberal on social issues or optimistic about 
human nature. Another contention from this study is that
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an expert witness is believable and can influence the 
perceptions of student jurors. Further research was needed 
to clearly establish the validity of this second 
interpretation. The results also confirmed the findings of 
previous research which suggested that dichotomous and 
continuous measures may not reflect a single judgmental 
process. Student juror's verdicts did not entirely 
coincide with punishment levels. It was hypothesized that 
verdict choices (dichotomous) may have been influenced by a 
determination of how responsible a person was for the 
development of his or her problems. Students may have felt 
more sorry for defendants certain conditions or felt they 
were in some way victims. The assigned punishment 
(continuous) appears to have been related to predictions 
about future liklihood of committing a similar crime. No 
sex differences emerged in the study and the Domestic Crime 
condition resulted in higher ratings of stress than the Bar 
Scene condition. Interpretations of these latter two 
findings were left uspecified. Suggestions for future 
research were offered as well as a caution about the 
possible limitations of the generalizability of the 
results.
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Mitigating EaptQcs Under current Montana law a person charged with deliberate 
homicide can have the charge reduced to mitigated 
deliberate homicide if the homicide is committed under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional stress. Such a 
reduced charge would result in a substantially reduced 
prison sentence. Recent court cases in Montana have used 
many of the following examples as mitigating circumstances. 
We would like you to rate each example on a 1 to 7 scale as 
to how mitigating you believe that circumstance to be.
.Intoxication by alcohol
.Physically abused as a child
.Recently lost job
.Abandoned by parents as a child
.Recently divorced
.Physically ill
.Long-standing mental illness
.Under the influence of drugs
.Raised in poverty
.Emotionally abused by parents
.Raised by multiple sets of foster parents
.Recent death of a loved one
.Threat of divorce by spouse
.Multiple personality.Recent discovery of spouse unfaithfulness
.Lack of sleep
.Recent mental illness
.Overdependence on spouse
.Blackouts
.Overly strict parents 
.Overly strict parents 
.Biochemical imbalance in brain 
.Mental retardation
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Page 85
APPENDIX B
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Factor Analysis
1 2 3 4 5 Comm
Physical Abuse .81 .14 .05 .13 .05 .698
Emotional Abuse .76 .28 .24 .10 .02 .724
Abandonment .69 .14 .24 -.03 .10 .564
Foster parents .61 .24 .33 .06 .17 .571
Poverty .54 .13 .31 .14 .15 .447
Strict parents .47 .11 .23 .03 .38 .431
Mental illness (long) .26 .76 .07 .18 .00 .683
Biochemical imbalance .12 .75 .23 .04 -.05 .634
Mental illness (short) .15 .72 .18 .16 .16 .625
Multiple personality .24 .67 -.04 -.02 .22 .557
Mental retardation .06 .66 .26 .07 -.19 .548
Blackouts .13 .54 .11 -.05 .29 .407
Divorce .32 .12 .73 .04 .12 .666
Death (loved o n e ) .27 .26 .66 .13 .12 .607
Job loss .18 .09 .62 -.02 .17 .454
Divorce threat .33 .09 .61 .05 .40 .652
Physical illness .02 .35 .48 .16 .06 .383
Unfaithful spouse .38 .16 .45 .21 .19 .453
Drug abuse .26 .10 .06 .84 -10 .797
Alcohol intoxication .01 .11 .13 .79 .18 .686
Overdependence (spouse) -30 .10 .20 .19 .65 .599
Lack of sleep .03 .05 .24 .16 .65 .509
% of variance 15.4 15.1 12.8 7.3 7.0 .577
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Factors
1 Traumatic Childhood
2 Mental Illness
3 Recent Stress
4 Substance Abuse
5 ???????????????
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Thank you for being here today. To begin this study, you 
are first going to read the legal definitions concerning 
homicide in Montana. You will then read information about 
a homicide committed in Montana and portions of expert 
testimony offered in the trial. Please read the 
information carefully. You will be asked to determine a 
verdict just as you would in a jury trial. In addition you 
will be asked other questions about the case. Consider 
these questions carefully as your answers will be compared 
to verdicts returned by jurors in similar cases.
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M.QiLtana SJ:a-t»j;s
Under Current Montana Law a person is charged with criminal 
homicide if he purposely, knowingly, or negligently causes 
the death of another human being. The definitions of 
various levels of criminal homicide are taken from the 
Montana Code and read as follows :
Deliberate Homicide:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes deliberate 
homicide if it is committed purposely or 
knowingly;...
Mitigated Deliberate Homicide:
Criminal homicide constitutes mitigated 
deliberate homicide when a homicide which 
would otherwise be deliberate homicide is 
committed under the influence of extreme 
mental or emotional stress for which 
there is reasonable explanation or excuse.
Negligent Homicide :
Criminal homicide constitutes negligent 
homicide when it is committed negligently.
A person acts negligently when he should 
have been aware of but disregards a risk 
that the result will occur or that a 
circumstance exists.
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On OctODer 2, 1982, Mark and Sherrie Williams separated 
after having been married for slightly over 2 years. 
Approximately 2 weeks later, on October 15, Sherrie 
reportedly told Mark that she planned to start divorce 
proceedings . Later that night Mark drove to Sherrie's 
apartment and says he "only intended to try to talk her out 
of filing for divorce". A short while after arriving at 
the apartment, an argument erupted between the couple which 
led to physical violence. When the police arrived, Sherrie 
lie bleeding on the floor and Mark was standing over her. 
A kitchen knife was lying on the floor between them, 
Sherrie died of stab wounds on her way to the hospital.
Te.s.t,imgn̂
Lisa Mayland had been a neighbor of the Williams' for 
the past year and a half. She lived in the apartment 
directly below the Williams'. She testified that on the 
night of the crime she had heard an argument between Mark 
and Sherrie. She told the court that she had first tried 
to call Sherri Williams but called the police when no one 
answered. Ms. Mayland also testified that she had heard 
numerous other arguments coming from the Williams' 
apartment. She was, however unaware of any previous 
physical violence. Ms. Mayland testified that she had 
called the police on this particular night because Sherrie
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Williams had told her she was planning to get a divorce but 
was afraid of how Mark might react. When questioned more 
about her fears of Mark's behavior she just said that he 
was always moody and just seemed to "not be himself for the 
last few months".
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On October 2, 1982, Richard Allen and Mark Williams 
had been playing pool in a downtown bar. That night they 
had argued and Mark left the bar after the bartender 
threatened to call the police. Approximately 2 weeks 
later, on October 15, Mark returned to the bar, saw Richard 
sitting alone at a table and sat down with him. He 
reportedly wanted to try to make things up with Richard and 
continue being friends. However, a short while later, 
Richard and Mark began arguing again and were soon yelling 
and pushing each other. When the police arrived, Richard 
lie bleeoing on the floor and Mark was standing over him. 
A hunting knife was lying on the floor between them. 
Richard died of stab wounds on his way to the hospital.
Relevant Tag,tilP.<?DY
James Lee, a bartender working the night of the crime, 
testified that Richard and Mark were regular customers and 
played pool there quite often. He told the court that he 
had seen them argue on other occasions and had threatened 
to call the police during an argument 2 weeks before the 
homicide. On the night of the crime he called the police 
as soon as he noticed the men arguing because he had 
already warned them.
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Jim Cummings, a mutual friend of both Richard and Mark 
testified as to events prior to the crime. He told the 
court that Mark had recently separated from his wife and 
she had threatened divorce. During that time Mark had 
turned to Richard for support and they had been spending a 
lot of time together. After the argument on October 2,
Mark had told Jim that his friendship with Richard was 
over. Mr. Cummings stated that Mark would not tell him 
any details, only that he and Richard had a major blowup. 
In further testimony, Mr. Cummings told the court that 
Mark Williams was always moody and that he just seemed to 
"not be himself for the last few months".
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The defendant Mark Williams entered a plea of Guilty to 
Mitigated Deliberate Homicide. The prosecution, however, 
pressed charges for the more serious charge of Deliberate 
Homicide to which Mark plead Not Guilty. Because of the 
plea and nature of the crime, the focal issue became 
whether or not the defendant suffered from extreme mental 
or emotional stress. Dr. Nicholas, a psychologist, was 
called to testify about the nature of stress which may have 
influenced Mark Williams' actions. His testimony will be 
considered in more detail because of its relevance to 
determining mitigation in this trial.
Please state your full name.
Dr. Kevin Lee Nicholas.
Dr. Nicholas, you are a clinical psychologist, is that 
correct?
That is correct. Would you tell the court about your 
educational and professional background?
I received by B.A. in psychology from the University of 
Minnesota in 1963, an M.A. in Clinical Psychology from the 
University of Washington in 1966, and a PhD. in Clinical 
Psychology also from the University of Washington in 1968. 
I completed a year long internship at the Indiana Medical 
Center in Indianapolis. I have been a practicing 
psychologist for the past 16 years and have been doing 
court evaluations for the last 11.
How many such evaluations have you completed?
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I'm sorry I don't have an exact record, but I have 
evaluated numerous people for the court over the last eleven years.
Have you had occasion to evaluate the defendant Mark Williams?
Yes I have.
On how many separate dates did you see the defendant?
I saw him on 5 separate days in a span of 3 weeks.
What did the evaluation involve?
My evaluation is based upon an extensive clinical 
interview, psychological testing, and reports of the crime 
and defendant’s history sent to me by the court.
What psychological tests were used in your evaluation?
I administered tests which are a standard part of a 
psychological evaluation. The battery of tests included 
the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised, the MMPI, 
the Rorschach Inkblot Test, and a Sentence Completion Test.
Did your evaluation lead to a conclusion regarding the 
level of stress suffered by the defendant, Mark Williams, 
at the time of the alleged crime?
Yes it did.
Could you state your conclusions to the court?
It is my professional opinion that Mark Williams was 
suffering from a considerable amount of psychological 
stress.
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Dr, Nicholas, are you aware of the statutes regardinghomicide in the State of Montana?
Yes I am,
You are aware of the law that states Deliberate Homicide is 
Mitigated Deliberate Homicide when it is committed under 
the influence of extreme mental or emotional stress for 
which there is reasonable explanation or excuse?
Yes, I am aware of that law.
You stated that the defendant was suffering from a
considerable amount of stress.
That's correct.
In your professional opinion was the defendant suffering 
from enough mental or emotional stress to constitute 
mitigated homicide?
(The opposing attorney objected to this question and it was
sustained. The judge reminded the jury that the expert
witness was there to aid the jury in drawing conclusions
about the facts of the case. The determination of the
defendant's guilt is a matter for the jury to decide,)
Could you tell the court about the nature of defendant's 
psychological stress?
(Another objection. This one was overruled,)
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Yes, the defendant's stress was a result of his traumatic childhood. As a child Mark was subject to both physical 
and emotional abuse. According the the SRS records sent by 
the court, Mark's parents were investigated for physical 
abuse and neglect when Mark was in grade school. Before 
completion of the investigation his parents abandoned him 
by leaving him with a babysitter and not returning. The 
stat subsequently gained custody of Mark and he spent the 
remainder of his youth and adolescence in 5 separate foster 
placements. Mark did report that none of these homes was a 
happy experience. The results of my evaluation indicate 
that Mark has very low self-regard. He oftens ruminates 
about losing significant others and is prone to anxiety 
attacks when his fears surface.
Doctor, in your opinion, how might this have been related 
to the crime?
During the 2 week time that Mark and Sherrie were separated 
he was thinking almost only of her. When she called on 
that day and announced her plans for a divorce, Mark 
panicked. He went to try and reconcile the marriage and 
after she refused it was as if all his former feelings of 
rejection and anger overtook him. His action at the time 
of the crime could have been a symbolic re-enactment of the 
rage he felt, but repressed during all his previous 
abandonments.
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Yes, the defendant's stress was a result of his traumatic
childhood. As a child Mark was subject to both physical 
and emotional abuse. According to the SRS records sent by 
the court, Mark's parents were investigated for physical 
abuse and neglect when Mark was in grade school. Before 
completion o the investigation his parents abandoned him by 
leaving him with a babysitter and not returning. The state
subsequently gained custody of Mark and he spent the
remainder of his youth and adolescence in 5 separate foster 
placements. Mark reported that none of these homes was a 
happy experience. The results of my evaluation indicate 
that Mark has very low self-regard. He often ruminates 
about losing significant others and is prone to anxiety 
attacks when his fears surface.
Doctor, in your opinion, how might this have been related 
to the crime?
During the 2 week time that Mark and Richard were separated 
he was constantly of him. After they began to quarrel in 
the bar, Mark panicked. When it became clear that the 
friendship was going downhill it was as if all his former 
feelings of rejection and anger overtook him. His action 
at the time of the crime could have been a symbolic 
re-enactment of the rage he felt, but repressed, during 
previous abandonments.
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Yes the defendant's stress was a result of mental illness. 
My evaluation indicates that under normal circumstances
Mark's personality is characterized by self-control, 
avoidance of criticism and seeking of approval. In
structured situations he is likely to be self-controlled, 
rigid and inhibited. However, when faced with uncertain 
and unstructured situations, his controls give way to what 
can best be described as "illogical paranoid ruminations". 
What this means is that when Mark is not sure where he 
stands in a situation, then he is likely to misinterpret 
other's motives and look for evidence that they are trying 
to do him harm. Another important aspect of my evaluation 
was Mark's difficulties in expressing anger. He is usually 
able to control any feelings of anger, but when he loses 
control, the buildup of angry feelings is likely to 
explode. This outburst will usually be accompanied by a
self righteous and highly rationalized explanation. Under 
severe stress, Mark is at risk for developing paranoid
beliefs and delusions accompanied with self-righteous 
anger.
Doctor, in your opinion, how might this have been related 
to the crime?
Mark told me that in the 2 weeks that he was separated from
his wife, he began to believe that she was trying to ruin
his whole life. He mentally reviewed their entire
relationship and came to the conclusion that the whole
reason she married him was just to use him and then get rid 
of him. Just prior to visiting his wife, Mark became 
convinced that she was one of "Satan's Dark Angels" and she 
was part of a plan to destroy him. Although no one can be 
entirely certain, based on my evaluation of Mark's 
functioning it is possible that he was suffering from a 
paranoid delusion when the incident occurred.
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Yes, the defendant's stress was a result of mental illness. 
My evaluation indicates that under normal circumstances 
Mark's personality is characterized by self-control, 
avoidance of criticism and seeking of approval. In 
structured situations he is likely to be self-controlled, 
rigid and inhibitea. However, when faced with uncertain 
and unstructured situations, his controls give way to what 
can best be described as "illogical paranoid ruminations". 
What this means is that when Mark is not sure where he 
stands in a situation then he is likely to misinterpret other's motives and look for evidence that they are trying 
to do him harm. Another important aspect of my evaluation 
was Mark's difficulties in expressing anger. He is usually 
able to control any feelings of anger, but when he loses 
control, the buildup of angry feelings is likely to 
explode. This outburst will usually be accompanied by a 
self-righteous and highly rationalized explanation. Under 
severe stress Mark is at risk for developing paranoid 
beliefs and delusions accompanied with self-righteousness.
Doctor, in your opinion, how might this have been related 
to the crime?
Mark told me that in the 2 weeks that he was separated from 
Richard he began to believe that he was trying to ruin his 
whole life. He mentally reviewed their entire relationship 
and came to the conclusion that the whole reason they had 
become friends was just so Richard could use him and then 
get rid of him. Just prior to seeing him in the bar, Mark 
became convinced that he was one of "Satan's Dark Angels” 
and he was sent as part of a plan to destroy him. Although 
no one can be certain, based on my evaluation of Mark's 
functioning it is possible that he was suffering from a 
paranoid delusion when the incident occurred.
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Yes, the defendant's stress was a result of disturbing
current life problems. In addition to his wife's threat of
divorce, a number of traumatic events have recently
happened to Mark. The first of these was that he had
injured his back and neck in a car accident about 4 months 
prior to the incident. After that Mark was no longer able 
to work and lost his job as a warehouseman. His doctor 
told him that it is unlikely that he can return to his job 
in the near future. Mark was unable to find less physical 
work and went on unemployment. He hasn't received 
workman's compensation because his injury was not job 
related and his medical insurance only partially covered 
his expenses. So Mark also had medical bills which he was 
unable to pay. Another major stressful event for Mark was 
the loss of his mother, who died of cancer about one month 
prior to the incident. Mark was close to his mother and 
became quite depressed following her death.
Doctor, in your opinion how might these events have been 
related to the crime?
Well, the 2 weeks that Mark was separated from his wife, he 
began to feel desperate. He was unable to work, had bills 
to pay, and had just lost his mother. Research suggest 
that as the amount of stress increases in a person's life 
they are more likely to act violently. When his wife 
threatened to divorce him, he felt overwhelmed and stated 
that he just couldn't believe this was happening. It would 
appear that Mark's actions toward Sherrie were in response 
to all of the current stress he was experiencing.
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Yes, the defendant's stress was a result of disturbing 
current life problems. In addition to his wife's threat of 
divorce a number of traumatic events have recently happened 
to Mark. The first of these was that he had injured his 
back and neck in a car accident about 4 months prior to the 
incident. After that, Mark was no longer able to work and 
he lost his job as a warehouseman. His doctor told him 
that it is unlikely that he can return to his job in the 
near future. Mark was unable to find less physical work 
and went on unemployment. He didn't receive workman's 
compensation because his injury was not job related and his 
medical insurance only partially covered his expenses. So 
Mark also had medical bills which he was unable to pay. 
Another major stressful event for Mark was the loss of his 
mother, who died of cancer about one month prior to the 
incident. Mark was close to his mother and he became quite 
depressed following her death.
Doctor, in your opinion, how might these events have been 
related to the crime?
Well, the 2 weeks that Mark was separated from his friend, 
he began to feel desperate. He was unable to work, had 
bills to pay, and had just lost his mother. Research 
suggests that as the amount of stress increases in a 
person's life they are more likely to act violently.When he 
couldn't reconcile with his friend he felt overwhelmed and 
stated that he just couldn't believe this was happening. 
It would appear that Mark's actions toward Richard were in 
response to all the current stress he was experiencing.
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Yes, the defendant's stress was the result of an altered 
state due to alcohol and drug abuse. During the 2 week
separation, Mark was spending most of his time in bars
drinking. He was not taking care of himself and getting
very little sleep. As established in the court record,
Mark had taken some pills at a friend's house which he 
thought would give him just a little pick up. Blood test 
reports from the police record indicated that the pills 
Mark had taken were in fact amphetamines. Drugs, alcohol, 
and little sleep all lower defenses and reduce a person's 
normal level of control. The combination of alcohol and 
amphetamine can be especially dangerous. In some cases 
people may have extreme reactions to pharmacological 
substances which dramatically change their personalities. 
At any rate, Mark's condition at the time of the crime
would have made him vulnerable to losing control.
Doctor, in your opinion how might this have been related to 
the crime?
Mark had taken the pills with the stated hope that he would 
be better able to talk. However, the combination of 
alcohol and amphetamine likely resulted in Mark's being 
hypersensitive and irritable. In my opinion he had much
less control than he normally would have. It is even 
possible that due to the combination of amphetamine and
alcohol that he was in an extremely altered mental state at 
the time of the incident, although its hard to judge in any 
one case because individuals have differential responses to 
pharmacological substances.
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Well, even though I stated that the defendant was under 
considerable stress, this must be considered in light of my entire evaluation. The results of my evaluation indicate 
that the defendant has poor control over antisocial 
impulses in general. According to the court record and the 
history that I collected Mark had a number of problems with 
school, parents, and authority as an adolescent. Most of 
his problems seem to have stemmed from a rebellious 
attitude during that time. As an adult, he has had trouble 
maintaining continuous work because of frequent 
disagreements with superiors. My testing results were 
consistent with Mark's past in that they revealed a pattern 
that is characteristic of individuals who act impulsively 
without considering the rights of others. While there may 
be a veneer of social correctness and some guilt and regret 
over past events, it is unlikely that these feelings will 
have much effect on future behavior. In general, I would 
say that the defendant has a poorly integrated conscience 
and is quick-tempered by nature.
Doctor, in your opinion, how might this have been related 
to the crime?
While Mark was under stress, it is my opinion that the 
crime that he has been charged for could be simply an 
exaggerated form of his normal behavior. He has had a history of an inability to maintain relationships and he is 
easily angered. He has used threat to get what he wanted 
in the past, but in this case his behavior seemed to have 
escalated beyond that of mere threat.
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I student juroc ______
Williams, guilty of: (circle one)do find the defendant, Mark
Deliberate Homicide Mitigated Deliberate 
Homicide
The maximum sentence for Deliberate Homicide in Montana is 
100 years in prison. The maximum sentence for Mitigated 
Deliberate Homicide is 40 years in prison. Please indicate 
the sentence you feel would be most appropriate. (Use the 
scale corresponding to your verdict.)
Deliberate Homicide
No time 
served
.10___20___ 30___ 40___50___60___70___80___90___ 100Maximum
sentence
Mitigated Homicide
.8. 12.
No time 
served
.16___20___ 24___ 28___32___ 36___ 40
Maximum
sentence
Rate the defendant's relative level of 
his action:
0 1_
Behavior is 
a result of 
situation
.8.
responsibility for
.9___ 10
Behavior is 
not a result of 
situation
How much stress was the defendant under at the time of the 
crime?
0___1___ 2___3___ 4___ 5___6___ 7.
No stress
.8___9___ 10Extreme stress
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How likely is this person to commit a similar crime in the 
future?
0___1___ 2___ 3___ 4___5___6___7___ 8___9___10Very unlikely Very Likely
Rate your agreement to the following statement: The expert
testimony was realistic.
0___1___2___3___ 4___5___6___7___ a___9___ 10
Strongly Strongly
Agree Disagree
Please describe in your own words the factors that were 
most important in determining your verdict and punishment.
What additional items of evidence would have been helpful 
in making your decisions?
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Please provide the information asked for below. Everything will be held strictly confidential.
Age____
Sex M F (circle one)
Year in college: 1 2  3 4 Grad (circle one)
Major : ___________
Have you ever served on a jury before? Yes No (circle 
one)
Have you or has anyone close to you been the victim of a 
violent
crime? Yes No (circle one)
If yes, what was the nature of that crime?
I,   promise not to discuss the nature
ofthis research with anyone for a period of one month.
I,_   promise to keep all your
material
confidential.
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